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FOREWORD 
The Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 on the technological p~oblems of 
nuclear safety foresees the Community action in respect of the progres-
sive harmonization of safet~ requirements and criteria. to proceed in 
three stages. 
The first s~age is the exchange of information and the listing of the 
m~thodologies, iriteria and standards applied in the different Member 
States. This has been largely completed, even though it is necessary 
to revise.periodically the established inventories in order to take 
into account the evolutionary charact•r of technological problem~ of 
I 
nuclear safety. 
The second staQe consists in identjfying the similarities and dissi-
' 
.milarities and"in analysing reasons for their ~xisteAce. 
'. 
The aim of the third stage is the ~stablish~ent of Recommendations 
I . 
pursuant to Art'icle 124 second in~ent of the E'uratom Treaty. 
,·, 
During the work relating to tfie f~rst and·second stages mentioned above 
conducted within the Working Gr~up on safety of' light water reactors 
' 
"Methodology, criteri_a, codes a~d standards" with the active collabo-
ration of the representativ~s.from regulatory bodies, licensing 
authorities and/or assciciated s~fety an~ ~ontrol organizations, 
utilities and equipment vendors, it appeared that any specific ~armoni­
z'ation can onlY: be based on a previous harmonh~ation effort on the 
basic princ·iples of safety, on .which requirem~~ts .and criteria deoend. 
A Task Force was set up, compos~d of exp.erts .fh)m the natio,al safety 
-- ..... 
authorities and supported by tn.; competent 'services of the Commission, 
\ 
" to compile a set of basic safe~y principles; and. a scheme ·for subsequent 
l '\'' ' ' .. 
. ,
requir~ments and criteria for''\,il<ight 
. \! 
may, in general, also· be applied-to 
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water rea~tor nuclear power plants, w~tich 
other typ~s.of nuclear power stations. 
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II. 
The result of this task is given in the present document which was 
formally approved by the Commission and which is brought to the 
knowledge of the other Community institutions and the public. 
With·this docum~nt the Commission makes known the basic safety principles 
for light water reactor nuclear power plants in terms-which can easiLy 
be understood ·and replies to the mounting emphasis and attention to 
~afety by nuc~ear industry, regulatory bodies, and by the publi_c at large. 
These basic principles, constituting the fundamental and general 
safety principles, form an entity. Though general in nature, they shall 
m~ke a contribution to the thinking_in the Member States and the Community· 
institutions on problems regarding Light water reactor safety and in 
. . ' 
particular are.intended to form. the framework which can be used as 
I J !t ' 
reference for judgments that m~st' be made in the safety evaluation 
' ,. 
process by regulatory bodies, Licensing authorities, utilities, equipment 
vendors, architect engineers etc. to adopt a consistent' and uniform · ~ 
approach. 
T~is document will:form the basis for furth~r harmonization activities. 
·' 
, 
• 
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Introduction. 
Most human activities present a potential hazard to 
the health and safety of individuals and of society as a whole. 
In general terms it can be said that the larger the potential 
-,· - 1 
consequences of a hazardous event the greater the effort of man 
. - . 
' •• \' !-
and society to reduce the probability of the event arid to limit ,its' 
' -
con sequences. 
The peaceful ,uses of nuclear energy.have, been developed from ~e 
beginning with special concern for protection against risks; that 
is with particular attention to the prevention of accidents and the 
limitation of adverse consequence~. 
' Such concern could not fail to ~of interest at Communinity level, 
'', t 
and it can be found in different ·f'ticles of the Euratom Treaty and. 
also in the Council Resolution of .July 22, 1975, on technological 
problems of nuclear safety. In .the light of this resolution 
activities have been developed, in particular ~ith respect to 
progressive harmonization of safety requiremen.ts and er iteJ!' ia. 
Iri this context one can make the following observations 
- a harmonization of requirements and criteriar although possib1e at 
.certain levels, is not practicable at all levels, because requirements 
and er iteria often tefer, for example, to a specific aspect of a 
protectlve function,which may be achieved in different ways; 
any h~rmonization can only be based on a previous effort 
of harmonization of _fundamental principles of safety, on Which the 
requirements and criteria depend; 
1: ·, 
- although the aim is to achieve an equivalent and satisfactory degree 
·of protection of the populat-ion and of the environment, the way 
to 9btain this degree of protection may differ from country to 
country. 
-
'lbe basic pr ipoiples, however t must and can be common, 
'4 
i 
as far as they reflect objectives but not the way to reach them. 
I '. 
!1 :: 
' . 
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The principles given herein are of a general nature and for the use of 
designers, operators and assessors. 
The harmonization of safety principles, requirements and/or criteria, 
' 
even though desirable, is ~o~ sufficient to·guarantee the harmoni-
. zation of the levels of safety. In addition the sole application of 
technical aspects does not guarantee the safety of a nuclear installa-
. ' 
tion if it is· not. accompanied. by complete and detailed assessments 
coupled with app~opriate inspection and enforcement activities. 
.. . 
,' <.I•' 
Nevertheless the harmonization of basic {fundame~tal and general safety) 
principles is the necessary starting point for any furthe-r harmonization.· 
V I~ 
Purpose .and scope of the document. 
The described principles in this document are divided into two 
categories.- The first category give$ the fundamental safety principles 
upon which the second category is based. 
This secorid category gives the general safety principles to 
achieve the objectives as given in the first· category i.e. to avoid 
acciderits and to limit the radiological consequences of the operation 
of the nuclear power plant during all operational _states and 
accident conditions. 1) 
The document includes a third ~rt, giving a list of subjects in 
which safety requirements might be worked out in order to fulfill 
the general saf~ty p~inciples as given in the second part. 
/, n 
1) See definitions in Append~ 
i 
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From the introduction it will be clear that it is not , the intention 
to impose the ways. in which the objectives should 'be attained. Neither 
< 
is it the intention ·to state the requirements which might.b~ worked out 
i 
at an appropriate time in an appropriate sequence since it is nec~ssary 
' ' 
to take into account the difficulties in harmonization~ 
The principles given in this document refer to LWR Nuclear Power Plants 
thot.~gh they may, in gener .. l, be applied to o·ther M.types of nuclear power 
plants •. 
I' 
• 't 
Remark The use of technica~, t~·~.~s which are of special character 
or the meaning of which has t~ be ·~pecified was reduced to. a minimum in 
this document.. However, for ·certain expressions it seemed to be neces-
sary to provide definitions (see appendix). Definitions were' taken from 
. * the Codes of Practice of the IAEA Safety Series SO • 
PART I I i 
,, . 
Fundamental safetx principles. 
1. Nuclear power plants shall be sited, designed, constructed, 
tested, operated, and decornrnissioned so as to provide 
reasonable assurance there is no undue .risk to the .workers, 
the general public and the environment. 
In this document only the radiological aspects related to. human health 
will be considered~ no guidance is given on environmental aspects such as 
protection of natural, agricultural and industrial, environment and human 
habitat i neither is specific reference made to site selection principles 
even though, in the complex area ·of siting, exchange of information is 
going on in the frame of Community activities. 
i 
* IAEA • InternatiOnal I Atomic Energy Agency - Vienna 
. : 
\. 
4. 
:.: . The chatacter is tic hazard of a nuclear power plant has its origin. in 
<' - the amount of radioac:tiv.e products -present in the plant. · 
· · Harm to man may ad se from ionising racHationa ·emitted from radioa.ctive 
materials . taken in~o the body by inhalation and by, inge•tion and alao 
from external radiation. 
'lbere~ore 
2. Measures shal~ be taken to ensure that radioactive materials 
which are present in the installations are confined in an 
appropriate manner. 
{t 
3. The .release of radioactive materials shall be as low as reasonably 
· achievabler. · I .. • I 
: i 
4. Adequate ,1steps shall be taken in the, 4esign, operation and 
. 
. 'decommissi9ning of the' plant to ensure th•t all exposures 
to ionising radiations are as low as reasonably achievable •. 
The foregoing principles are primarily aimed at normal operation of. 
the plant (including waste ·handling), but are also applicable to 
accident conditions. 
Our ing normal operation of a nuclear power plant _some radiation 
, ~xposure of site personnel and members of the !public is unavoidable. 
Some discharge of radioactivity in gaseous or liquid form will take place 
and this results in an exposure pathway to the .Public. The doses from 
d~scharges.of radioactivity during normal operatipn of a NPP.can however 
be kept~very low when appropriate provisions are.applied. 
,. 
In addition safe operation of the plant requires a proper level of 
supervision, including inspections, maintenance, waste treatment, and 
repairwork which give rise to. radiation exposur~ to site personnel. 
•' 
• 
• 
a • 
Consequently, the following protection principle applies, in agreement 
with the Euratom directive on radiation protection and with the recom-
* mendations of the I.C.R.P. 
I) 
S.Individual ~oses shall always be kept within prescribed limits. 
In- addition individual and collective doses to both site 
personnel and the general public shall be .. kept as low as 
reasonably achievable in all oper&tr.·ional states of the 
nuclear power plant. 
It is important to take into aacount the relationship between the dose 
'· 
to site personnel and that to the general public. 
Note : 
In order to determine whether a reduction in dds~ below the 
recommended limits is "reasonably achievable" it is necessary to 
consider on the one hand the increase in benefit from such a reduction 
and on the other the increase in cost (social and economical) involved 
in its achievement. According to the ICRP an optimum is obtained at a 
value of the collective dose such that the increase in cost of protec_ 
tion per unit dose equivalent balances the reduction of detriment per 
unit dose (ICRP 26, pa 74). 
The application of the recommended optimization process is not at 
the stage where common quat:ttitative limits for collective dose can 
be give~. 
The prev.ention of ace idents and, since accidents might nevertheless 
occur, the mitigation of their consequences are both of fundamental 
importance. The more serious the potential consequences of accidents, 
the more stringent the requirements will be to prevent the faults 
leading to such accidents. Furthermore these accidents will require 
extensive protective measures to confine the radioactive products. 
This leads to the following principles : 
6. All· reasonably practicable steps shalil be taken to prevent 
accidents. (1: 
* International Commision on Radiological Protection 
r. 
6. 
7. All reasonably practicable steps shall be taken to minimize 
the radiological consequences to the general Public of any 
accident, should it occur. 
8. All reasonably practicable steps shall be taken to 
minimize the radiological consequences to site personnel 
o~any accident, should it occur. 
9. The more serious the potential consequences of an accident, 
~ 
the smaller should be the probability of its occurrence. 
To guarantee that all practicable steps can be taken by the site personnel 
to get an acciden,t situa,tion under control and tq .carry out all neces.sary 
actions to limit the consequences of accidents~ ·it is required that 
provisions are made to protect these personnel aqainst excessive radiation 
doses. 
'Jherefore 
10. PrO'Iisions shall be made to prevent the exposure of site 
personnel reaching levels which hamper the actions necessary 
to mitigate the consequences of an ~ident. 
Additional remarks concerning the above pcinciples : 
With respect to the implementation of the above .Principles 1, 3, 4 ana 
5 guidance is found in the Euratom Directive of the Council "Basic Safety 
. . 
Standards for the Health Protection of the general public and workers 
I 
. * against the dangers of Ionizing Radiation",15 July 1980 and in 
the "Recommendations of the I.C.R.P.". 
Dose limits for workers and the general public fg{ controllable exposures 
are prescribed for instance in Articles 7 to 1'3' of the above mentioned 
't ; 
-
Basic Safety Sta~ards. In addition, Article 6 .. requires that exposures 
must be kept as low as re~sonably achievable. The ICRP recommends for the 
AtARA principle an optimization process on the basis of a cost- b&nefit 
analysis. 
----- ,--·--- .... ---------··- ---··-·----· . -....,. o.·'~·-··' .... ~ 
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Deriving fr001 the ICRP recommendations ·it is advisable that already 
in the-planning stage .9f nuclear plants the aspect of individual 
annual doses and site personnel dose distribution are taken into· 
_ acco~nt. 
Guidance on the implementation ot" principles 6, 7·; ~a and 10 is 
. . 
. ) 
9iven in Part II with special reference to a "defense in depth" 
concept. Concerning the probabilistic aspects that are connected 
with principle 9 the followi09 can Qe stated 
i. t, 
i 
\. I'' 
Risk considerations combining probabilities of incident/accident 
situations and respective consequences, mainly radiological, have not 
been.introduced generally into the licensing procedure. First 
approaches in this oirection have, however, been made and an 
example in this r.espect derived from these approacpe5 is given in 
the Appendix to Part I. The main emphasis of 't.hese approaches is aimed 
at categorizing ~vents in reg~rd to frequencies and consequences 
of events and fault sequences. 
The scheme which is presented in this appendix 1 only gives a general 
. 
idea of categorizing events and fault sequences. Ca tegor iza tion 
in a· more quantitative manner. can be made up, when still more infor-
mation on the frequEmc.y and consequences of these events and fault 
sequences is available. 
... 
i'' 
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APPENDIX to Part I. 
1. Events (operational occurrences) with moderate frequency, any . 
• 
of which may occur in every nuclear power plant several times 
during plant life .. Due to the presence of. protective means in · 
the plant, these events do not escalate into situations where 
the prescribed yearly dose limits (operational limits) are excee-
ded, although duri~ short periods of time the normal exposure 
levels might be exceeded. 
Examples of postulated events are.: 
• loss of normal feed water 
partial loss of core coolant flow 
total loss of load and/or turbine trip 
• loss of off-site po1er. 
:~ 
-· 
2. Events or fault sequences, anyone of which· may occur during the 
l.ife time of a particular plant. Due to. the. presence of protective 
means in the plant, these events or fault sequences .. · are not 
expected to escalate into situations where external countermeasures 
to protect the public are -ne~essary othet than for instance on a 
precautionary basis a monitoring program (with respect to food 
stuffs) , although the prescribed yearly dose limits for normal 
operation might be exceeded. 
An ~xample of postulated event is : 
• loss of primary reactor coolant from a small ruptured-pipe 
of such an extent as to prevent normal;.·.reactor shut down and 
cool down, assUming make up is provided by normal make up 
only. 
• 
• 
--... ...... ~,·~·-
• 
3. Events or fault sequences not exped:.ed to occur during fhe 
. ' 
1., 
' life-time of a particular plant, but whose occurren~e is never-
., 
thel,ess considered in the design. 
Due to the prese.nce of protective means in the plant, these 
events o~. f<7~lt sequences are not expected to escalate into 
situations where ~tensive off-site countermeasures are 
required to protect the public. 
An example of postulated event is : 
• double ended break of a large pipe in the primary p-ressure 
boundary. 
4. HypOthetical events or fault sequences witn·a very remote 
probability whose occurrence is not considered in the design. 
These situations might require extended countermeasures 
. 
to protect. the public, based on an emer,~e~ey planning scheme. 
I~ ; 
n , • 
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PART II 
'General safety principles. 
In order to protect man and his ehvirol"!J''ent against the harmful effects 
of ionizing radiation, the nuclear power plant shall be designed, 
• I I ' 
constructed, tested and operated:aecording to a number of safety princi-
·1 jl \, \ 
ples. It is of prime importance to minimize the release and prevent the 
escape of, radioactive materials in all oJ?erational states and during 
accident conditions. 
-~ 
To achieve this safety objective ... ·~Def~·nse in depth" concept is 
. ~ r .· .• ·. j • . ,; 
usually employed. For examp;l,e1 fbur different sometimes successive 
: '. . I. , .. : 
and mutually reinforcing eche~~ns ·::o~':'~e:fe~se are required to 
', ' . :. '\. . ' 
prevent a se.rious accident a~.fec~i~.,·~e public.·· 
, ' . 
,. 
' I 
• A first echelon of defenfie in depth· emphasi!'eS accident prevention 
It requir~s that the plant be soundly and ic.onservatively designed, 
constructed a:nd operated in accordance with ~atr ingent quality levels 
and engineerl~ pr~ctices. 11 I • 
The basic. design must minimize the posaibil~ty of anticipated 
. operational occurrences and accident conditions. 
• A second echelon of defense is based Of) the assumpt'ion that 
failures or operating et:rors will'" occur· during the service life 
of a nucleat power plant, d~spite the care taken to prevent them. 
According;Ly, specific systems are required to· prevent or minimize 
damage from s:uch failures. The ~im her~ is to detect and inter~ept 
devi:ltion. frQm normal operating ·conditions ~'\ order to ,,prevent miMr ·_ 
i~io'!nt~. from escalating into major ones. 1 , 
';t 
··, 
in 
•. 
•• 
·-
t 
• 
11. 
A thir9 echelon provides additional safety ~ystems to protect 
the public against accidents. A number of accident sequences 
are selected as .a basis for the incorporation of these additional 
safety systems required to mitigate the consequences of such 
events • 
• A fourth echelon of defense, which is conceptually different from 
reactor design, is emergency preparedness, this relates to off-site 
as well as on-site planning. Emergency preparedne-ss· takes into 
account accident conditions which may lead to release of radioactive 
material that go beyond those of the events considered in the third 
echelon. 
One technical way to implement a defense in depth concept is the 
' . 
preservation of a series of barriers preventing the escape of' 
radioactive materials. 
The three ~rincipal barriers are the following,: 
• The first barri~r comprises the retaini~.ability of the fuel 
matrix and the fuel. cladding, It is es13ential to ensure the 
integrity of ·this barrier, therefore reliable cooling of the 
core and reactivity control must be provided to limit the fuel 
and cladding temperature during normal operation,- anticipated_ 
operational occurrenoe·s such as transients and in accident, 
conditions. In addition, reliable means must b4! provided to 
remove residual heat after shut down to preserve the integrity 
of the fuel elements. 1 ; 
,. 
•11 
,, 
r; 
n . 
• The second barrier is the primary pressure boundary; within this 
barrier the heat production and the heat exchange take place. 
This barrier prevents the escape of any radioactive materials which 
are present in the cooling fluid. Loss of ~ntegr~ty of this barrier 
leads to a loss of coolant, which in turn might lead to a failure of 
the fuel claddi~. Provisions are therefor~~necessary to limit the 
consequences of the failure of the second barrier. 
• The third barrier is constituted by the containment system. 
Its main function is to mitigate the consequences of an escape of 
radioactive materials from the primary circuit and to limit the 
escape of these materials into the environment. 
There are further aspects in connection with geperal safe€¥ principles~ 
The plant must be operated in such a manner th~t 'the· process and 
systems parameters are kept within ttK!ir oper~tional limits. Any 
deviation from operating ranges should be detected_and should 
lead to appropr-iate actions to keep process and system parameters 
within their safety limits. 
It must.be ensured that the reliability of the·Qtructures, systems 
.. 
and components· is maintained at an adequate:· level throughout 
plant-life in accordance with the ~afety functions to be performed. 
This is achieved by proper design, construction and operation, and 
by ensuring at the design stage th~t adequate facilities are 
available for testing, inspection, maintenance and repair. 
Operating experience can provide an important source of safety 
guidance for NPP's and therefore the lesso~s le~rned from operation 
and accidental conditions should be fed bac·k· into the desing, 
"' construction and operation of. nuclear power plants. 
An appropriate quality assurance programme is required and the 
I 
~\\o;\\it-r l~v~l ~ust. t~fl~t. ~ blport.~nc:-e to saf~~y -of structures, 
systems and components. . . ' 
• 
• 
I . 
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Of great-importance are also managerial and organiza~ional aspects, 
inciuding qualification and train~n~ of personnel. 
The impact of the site charaC.te.fi;sti.c~ and the activities carried 
', ! I ~~ ~ _.. 
out in the proximity on th~ ;'ea~ety of- the plant shall also be 
\ ,, . ' ' ,' . ' 
considered. Adequate prqtt;!ct1i.o~ ·shall be provided against external. 
', '1 ' ; ·{> : ' ,':1;' ' • : ,... ,... • 
impacts~of natural or man···~~e~·c;#igin. Such ~pacts are earthquakes, 
· •'1' , • • :1. ···I· 
I ',. •·l ' .• I ·.;1· 
floods, tornadoes,~ a:frpt.firie .'o:t;"·ashes, explosions, fires etc. 
i" ' ~:. (: ~. ·~ • 1 f 
.. . 
Although the importance of emergency planning as aq ultimate 
measure for the protection Q.f the. public against the effects of 
accidental releases is recQ9nized, it will not be treated specifi-
cally in this document. · 
' r: 
The foregoing considerations are expressed in the following general· 
safety pr incip~es a· I r 
t).• 
1. To implement the fundame.otal safety princiW,' - that all practical 
steps s~all. be taken to prevent accidents ~nd to minimize the 
radiological consequences of any accident should it occur - a 
"defense in depth" strategy-shall be applied. 
This strategy leads to the following requi~ements 
r I 
• Design, construction and :operat~o~ ()f the· pl_a~t shall 
provide adequate safety margin. in. normal operation, 
, ; . ~ ', . 
occ~rrence of system malfunct·ion~ and minimize the 
. 
' 
prevent the 
sensitivity· 
of the plant to failures, ·malfunction and maloperation. 
• • t ~ • 
~ '' ' . 
(• 
': \ 
- the plant shall be d~signed f• :constructed altd operated so that 
off-normal conditions. (such aa·anticipated operational occurrences} 
can be detected ·and ·minor incidents can be prevented fran escalating • 
. 
' 
'i 
' 
' 
'' 
I 
.t' 
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' 
- reliable features, as well as oper~tional and organizational 
provisions must be available to cope with any credible internal or 
external event or credible co~bination of them. This requires that 
the plant can be safely shut down and kept shut down, t~he r~sidual · 
heat can be removed and the release of radioactive materials is 
limited. 
- emergenGy plans (on site and off site) shall be provided • 
. , 
2. A safety evaluation shall be performed in particular to demonstrate 
that the design, the construction and the operation of the plant will 
take place according to the defense in depth strategy. This evaluation 
shall be based on tests, e~perience and analysis taking into account 
uncertainties in data and analysis. The safety evaluation shall show 
which kind of events and combination of them, as well as their conse-
quences, are taken into account. 
3. Structures, systems and components important to safety shall pe, 
designed, fabricated, erected, inspected and tested to a quality level 
conunensurate with the importance of. the safety functions to be 
performed. Where codes and standards are used, they shall be 
identified and evaluated to determine their adequacy and shall 
be suppleme.nted or modified if necessary .... 
-='. A qual'ity assurance programme shall be established and implemented 
in order to provide adequate assurance that these structures,· 
systems and components will satisfactorily perform their safety 
functions when required throughout their anticipated operational 
life in the plant. 
More in general there shall be a comprehensive quality assurance 
programme for the design, construction, commissioning, operation 
and decommissioning covering all activities which may have an 
· influence on the safety of the NPP. 
I 
• 11 
1., 
" 
' 
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•• 
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.. 
~· The reliability of a barri~r or of a safety system shall be 
commensurate with the safety function it has to p~rform. 
Equipment outages, single failures, common mode failures, and 
consequential failures (e.g. from equipment failures) have to be 
taken into account. Suitable measures'shall be taken to mintmize 
the .probability of occurrence of common mode failures. Other 
systems, structures or . components tha~ may inf~uence the .. _safety 
performance of these'barriers, safety systems or the plant as a 
I •,' ! 
whole also shall be considered. · . ··l ., 
•. jl. ,•· ': 'i. 
The ·requirements for safety ~~~~~,.m·. su~port features shall be 
·:·., f,', . I· 
consistent with those for th~,s~~ty ~Y,~tems supplied. 
/ ~~ ' l I r ',r j 1 '' ,: 
t'"' ·•• . '\ ' ' 
,\ , ·, ( t ·, ·.~ I ~ ~. , t 
s. All items i111porrtant to a,~fety1 ·~~~ ~ testable and maintainable 
commensurate with the safety~Jurt~~i+h to be periformed. If .structures,. 
!_ I ' ' 
systems or oomponents import;:ant to:~safety cannot, be tested to the 
.. I 
extent desirable, adequate ·~~fe~y precautions. shall be taken t,o 
compensate for possible undf~dovered failures • 
The effects of.radiation and other environmental conditions shall 
be considered in this ·context. . ; 
' 6. In addition· to Jthe protection aga.inst internal events, including for 
instance loss of coolant, fire and explosion, turbine explosion etc., 
protection· .against external events, either natu:Jtal (earthquakes, 
tornadbes, floods.etc.~ or man-made (fircraft crashes, chemical 
work~. accident;:s, mining operations etc.), has .to 'be ta·ken into 
account.· A quantitative probabilistic approach of these external 
events and their consequences may be consider~d·· 
,j 
7. Interaction· between the plant and the environment shall be taken 
into account. ·In this context, amo.ng~t others;: off-site. services, 
upon which' the· safety of the plant and protection of the plant 
perso~nel and the public may depend, shall be considered,· for 
example ultimate heat sink,.uelectrici·ty supply~and. fire fighting 
~ervices. 
, .I , il \),' 
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8. Structures, systems and components important to safety -shall not 
be shared between nuclear pow~r units on one site, unless it can 
be de.monstrated that an accident condition in one unit will not 
. 
affect the orderly shut down, cool down and residual heat r:emoval 
of the other unit on the site, taking into account situations such as 
the loss of off-site electrical power. 
9 •. In the interest of safety appropriate ergonomic principles shall 
be applied in the working areas and the working environment of the 
site personnel -with due regard to the actions to be taken by these 
personnel during normal operation and during accident situations. 
In addition the possibility of errors by site personnel should be 
minimized by proper design and admin.istrative meas.ures. 
10. Access to the safety and support systems shall be appropriately 
limited, bearing in mind the need to prevent. ·1unauthorized access 
and to guard against unintentional or intentional :damage. The methods 
employed shall include appropriate combinations of phy-sical protec-
' l1 {I • 
tion and administrative measures. 
11.The personnel must be sufficiently qualified and trained to perform 
the requ.ired tasks. It' 
!' j 
',I 
I. 
, 
·~ 
• 
• 
• 
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PART III 
Subjects for safety requirements 
1. Introduction 
While :Part II presents general safety principles, which have an overall 
importance . for the NPP, Part III lists systematically the main keywords 
for safety requirements some of which might be developed at a later 
stage. 
· It is recognized that some requirements cover ~re than one of the phases of : 
. 
- siting, 
... design, 
construction, 
- commissioning, 
oi)eration·, 
- decommissioning: 
l . 
these requirements have a different character fromlthose associated with 
·. 
the .phases giv~n above. They relate to the areas ··of 
- safety evaluations, 
-
- qua~ity assurance, ! : 
rad.iological protection, including waste treatment, 
- ergonomics, 
- emergency planning. 
For the specific phases of design, construction, commissioning, operation, 
. 
decommissioning, general requirements should be.developed related to every 
particular phase, followed by specific requirements related to the specific 
. * 
subjects of that phase. 
* A figure is attached which shows in a diagrammatic form an ou~line of the 
. propo~ed scheme for safety requirements. ' 
.,,. 
' .,..,,.,,. , .... .,,,... " ...... --·-· --~- _....,. ---~~·- -~ 
18. 
Section 2 of this Pa~t XII gives a draft list of the subjeots of 
general and specific requirements for the phases, and Sectio.n 3 
lists the main topics· to develop safety requirements for· the 
, ' I 
areas. 
2. Safety requirements for the phases. 
* 2.1.SITING 
general criteria for:.s:i:t~ ~teening and site selection 
'f ,, 
- criteria for taking .,into ·acqount external events 
•• ' '1 '~ 1 ~ '' 
criteria for defining Po~~Qtial effect~ of the NPP on 
1 
1 
',1 
1
, l.r 
the region 
- population conside~a~ions 
- floods 
- geology ans se isrnology 
- tornadoes 
air craft crashes 
chemical explosions and effects of dangerous gases 
- dispersion of radioactive materials 
- site-related radioecology aspects 
- population distribution 
- further .site-related parameters •. 
y 
... 
I •' 
.. 
':. 11 
* According to P~rt I', at this st•g •. , siting aspects are a ,,.~tter 
' , •1, 
of exchange of informations «mly.~;. • 
I •' ·~ • ! ',,_ ' 
--'• r; 's r :' 
' I•' 
'' I /' 
'. ,, 
' ' (. ~ ~- l • 
l. !, .. '1,, 
; 
. \ 
i· ,. 
'I 
• 
• 
~ I •• _____ ._ .............. ______ .,... ______ ;...;; _____ _,._-..,,.__,~.. -............ - ....... - ~------
• 
••• 1 lat:., 
,,, 
2.2 DESIGN 
General requirements 
--------------------
- safety classifications 
- reliability aspects (probabilistic, deterministiCi single failure 
criterion, diversity, physical separation, fail-safe behavioJ,.tr) 
- multiplant site 
decommissioning provisions. 
Structures, components and ~ystems 
- design against external events (natural and man-made) 
- effects associated with equipment failures (e.g. missiles, 
pipe wh,ip) 
- protection against fire and explosions 
7 buildings (incl. containment) 
Reactor core 
- reactor design (incl., inherent safety) 
- fuel elements 
reactor core control 
- reactor internals 
Reactor coolant system 
- reactor coolant system overall design 
- pressure boundary 
residual heat removal 
emergency core cooling 
.. 
auxiliaries for reactor coolant system (e.g. reactor coolant 
... :i.ean up) 
Power conve~sion system 
- steam generators 
- turbine 
,I 
,7 • 
10. 
• 
Instrumentation and control . 
- instrumentation overall design ~~--...~-'lOo--:--~~~ 
' ~ control-room and supplementary cont~ol-points 
radiation monitor inq and control of release of radioactive. aateri~ 
incident instrumentation 
- safety related instrumentation 
Reactor protection system 
~ 
- separation from control system 
Electric power supply 
- on-site power 
- off-site power 
emergency power 
Containment system 
..._overall design (e.g. leakage, testing, isolation) 
- auxiliaries (e.g. beat removal systeaJ atmospoere clean up system, 
containment internals) 
Auxiliary systems · 
fuel handling and storage 
·- ventilation systems 
- fire protection systems 
- further auxiliary systems 
,, 
, 
• 
• 
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2.3 COMMISSIONING AND OPERATION 
~!~!!!!_!!S~!!!~!~~~-
- operation surveillance 
- management organization 
- operational limits and conditions 
- recruitment, training and authorization of personnel 
~e!~!!!~-!~S~!!!~!~~~-!~!-!f!~!!!~-!~~l!£~! 
Canmission~ng 
- programme 
- test procedures 
Operation 
- procedures (power operation, refuelling, shutting down, 
plant modi~ications, etc.) 
-~instructions (operating manual, records and reports, including 
incident reporting, etc.) 
Maintenance, testing, examination and inspection 
- programme 
- procedures • 
-a a. 
• 
2.4 DECOMMISSIONING '! 
. At this stage,·. no requireme.nt is given for this pbase .. 
3. Safety requirements for ·the areas 
3. 1 SAFETY EVALUATIONS 
• Objectives 
• Documentation .(safety reports and suppo~tipg documents.).· 
• Procedures 
• Stages and topics 
n 
• Methodology 
deterministic (single failure criteria, postulated ·t 
initiating events 
·- prob;abilistic (risk concept, fault tree, reliability ••• )· ·' ... ·' 
3. 2 · QUALITY ASSURANCE 
.l'f I ••••• •••• # 
- Programmes 
- Organization 
COntrol (document, design, procurement, material, process) 
Inspection 
- Non-conformance 
- Corrective actions 
- Records 
- Audits 
I 
• 
• 
I 
• 
3.3 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, INCLUDING FUEL HANDLING AND 
WASTE TREATMENT· 
- Radiological protection aspect related to ~iting 
. 
- Radiological protection in the design stage 
" 
n during operation 
- Fuel handling and management 
Waste treatment 
f ... 
3.4 ERGONOMICS 'i'': 
Work-Environment (e.g. climate, lighting, noise and vibra-
tions) 
-Work-Area (e.g. design and arrangement of actuators and 
indicators) 
- Plant regulations and organization of work. 
3.5 EMERGENCY PLANNING 
- On-site planning 
Off-site planning 
- Coordination of on-site and off-site responsabilities. 
' ' 
' 
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APPENDIX 
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions are taken from the Codes of Practice of 
the IAEA Safety Serie-50. 
t ~. 
''• 
Accident conditions 
' ~ ' . 
Substantial dev.iation·s fronl'. Operational States which are expected to 
. ' . ' 
be infrequent, and which cq~d,,l'ead to release of unacceptable quantities 
. . . . . 
of radioactive materials ii ·the relevant engineered safety features did 
not function as per design intent. 
Antidipated Operational Occurrences 
All operational processes deviating from Normal Operation which 
are expected to occur once or several times during the operating life of 
the plant and whichv in view of appropriate design provisions, do 
not cause any significant damage to Items Important to Safety nor 
lead to Accident Conditions (see Operational States). 
Item~ Important to Safety 
The items which comprise 
(1) those structures, systems, and components whose malfunction 
or failure could lead to undue radiation exposure of the Site 
.,. 
Personnel or members of the public ; 
(2) those structures, systems and components which prevent 
Anticipated Operational Occurrences from leading to Accident 
Conditions; 
(3) those features which a.re. provided to mitigate the consequences 
of malfunction or failure of structures, systems or components. 
.. 
* This includes successive barriers set up against the release of radioactivity 
from nuclear facilities • 
I 11 
• 
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Normal Operation 
I 
Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant within specified Operational 
Limits and Conditions includinq shut-down, power operation, 
shutting down, starting up, mai~tena~e,·;_ ~eating and refuelling_.. 
(see Operational States). 
-.----!""~~ 
' -------~---
,. 
Operation * 'L' 
All activities performed ~··achieve; Jn a· safe manner, the 
j. ; . \ t :I •\~ 
purpose for which the plP.~J:: .. w~~; c:»n~~ucted, including maintenance, 
_' ·1• , f i : I , ~ • 
refuelling, in-service ib~tPection aljfi other· associated activities • 
.. -_,.' . . ' . 
I 
l • ; .·1 ,, 
Operational Limits anq Qonqitf~n~ 
! .• · 
A set of rules which set forth parameter limits, the functional 
capability and the performance levels of equipmenk and personnel 
approved· by the Regulatory Body for safe operation of the Nuclear 
Power Plant. 
~ 
Operational States 
The states defined under Normal Operation and Anticipated 
Operational Occurrences (see Normal Operation ~ Anticipated 
Operational occurrences)., 
Prescribed Limits ** 
Limits established or accepted by the Regulatory Body • 
*The terms Siting, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and 
Decopmmis~ioning are used to delineate the five major stages of the 
licensing process. Several of the stages may coexist for example, 
Construction and Commissioning, or Commissioning and Operation. 
** The term •authorized limits• is sometimes used for this term. 
I 
• 
• 
·-
... 
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Protection System 
A.system which encompasses all electrical and mechanical 
devices and circuity, from sensors to actuation device input 
terminals, involved in generating those signals associated with 
the.protective functio~. 
Protective System 
A safety system -·designed and installed to act automatically 
_to ensure that o-ne or more ·safety Limits are not violated. 
Quality Assurance 
Planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate 
confidence . that an item or facility will perform satisfactorily 
in service. 
Reliability 
The probability that a device, system or facility will perform 
its intended function satisfactorily for a specified_ time under 
stat~d operating conditions. 
Residual Heat 
The sum of the heat originating from radioactive decay and 
shut-down fission and the heat stored in reactor-related structures 
and in heat transport media. 
·safety Limits 
Limits upon process variables within which the Operation of the 
Nuclear Power Plant has been shown to be safe. 
, 
28. 
Safety Systems 
Systems important to Safety, provided to as~ure, in any condition, 
the safe shut-down of the · reactor and the heat removal from the 
core, and/or to limit the consequences of Anticipated <:>perational 
, Occurrences and Accident CoixUtions {see Anticipated Operational 
Occurrences and Accident Co~itions). 
Single Failure 
A random fail~re which ~esults in the loss of capability of a 
/ component to perform its intended safety· f~nctions. Consequential 
fE'lilUJ:@j;j .L'@Aulting from a lilif\910 random occurrence are considered 
to be part of the single failure. 
I 
Site 
The area containing the plant, defined by a boundary and under 
effective control of the Plant Management 
Site Personnel 
All persons working on the Site, either permanently or temporarily. 
' t f ~ 
11 
• 
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